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In this paper, we demonstrate how age-adjusted inequality measures can be used to evaluate 
whether changes in inequality over time are due to changes in the age structure. To this end, 
we use administrative data on earnings for every male Norwegian during 1967-2000. We find 
that the substantial rise in earnings inequality over the 1980s and into the early 1990s, is to 
some extent driven by the fact that the large baby boom cohorts are approaching the peak of 
the age-earnings profile. We further demonstrate that the impact of age adjustments on the 
trend in inequality during the period from 1993-2000 is highly sensitive to the method used: 
while the most widely used age-adjusted inequality measure indicates little change in 
inequality over this period, a new and improved age-adjusted measure suggests a decline in 
inequality. 
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The rise in earnings inequality in almost all developed countries since the early 1980s
is one of the most extensively researched topics in economics. While there is substantial
agreement about the facts, there is no consensus about the underlying causes. A number of
explanations have been proposed and scrutinized, including skill-biased technical change,
international trade and globalization, and changes in labor market institutions, such as a
decline in unionization and an erosion of the minimum wage.1 In this paper, we investigate
an alternative, demographic explanation: how much does the changing age structure
matter for the trend in inequality? Is the substantial rise in inequality over the 1980s
and into the early 1990s driven by the baby boom cohorts approaching the peak of the
age{earnings prole?
These questions spur from two stylized facts. First, there is a strong age{earnings
relationship. Both theoretical models and empirical results suggest a strong relationship
between age and earnings (see, e.g., Heckman et al., 2003). In particular, the age{earnings
relationship is rmly established as increasing during the working lifespan and usually de-
clining slightly when approaching retirement. This implies that the inequality of earnings
at a given point in time is likely to be present, even in an economy where everyone is com-
pletely equal in all respects but age. Second, almost all developed countries experienced a
large increase in the population growth rate following World War II, a phenomenon more
familiarly called the baby boom.2 Since the 1970s, the baby boomers have gradually
entered the labor market, and as their careers mature, they are making their way up the
age{earnings prole. Together, the changing age structure and the strong age{earnings
relationship may be an important determinant of the observed trends in earnings inequal-
ity over the last decades. Identifying the age eects on inequality and its trend over time
is also of interest from a normative perspective. It has long been argued that inequality
attributable to age should be of little concern for policymakers: dierences arising from
age even out over time and are therefore irrelevant for the distribution of lifetime earnings
(see, e.g., Atkinson, 1971).
In this paper, we empirically examine to what extent the changing age structure
can explain the trends in earnings inequality in Norway during the period of 1967{2000.
Specically, we adjust the trends in inequality for changes in the age composition of the
working-age population, using data from administrative registers on earnings for every
Norwegian. Our analytical sample is restricted to males, given their role of primary
breadwinner over most of this period.
1See, e.g., Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) and Lemieux (2008) for extensive reviews of the literature
on earnings inequality.
2The baby boomers usually include children born from 1946 to about 1960. For example, The US
Census Bureau considers a baby boomer to be someone born during the demographic birth boom be-
tween 1946 and 1964. Source: http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/age/general-age.html
Reading date: 2010/09/13.
2In some respect, our approach goes back to Paglin's (1975) pioneering paper, which
rst raised the question of the eects of the changing age structure on the trend in
inequality. While the validity of Paglin's method for isolating the age-eect on inequality
has been questioned from a number of perspectives { which we address in our analysis {
the issue of isolating the age eect on inequality remains an important research question.
In fact, given the rise in inequality accompanying the aging of the baby boom cohorts,
the issue may be viewed as being more important than in the earlier period (1947{1972)
considered by Paglin and others.3
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reports some stylized facts about the age{
earnings prole and the age structure in Norway, linking them to the observed trends in
earnings inequality. Section 3 sets out the methods used to identify and adjust for age
eects. Section 4 describes the data, and Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section
6 concludes.
2 Stylized Facts
Age{earnings proles are widely used by economists both to help forecast the course of
future earnings and to depict how earnings typically change over the life cycle. Panel A in
Figure 1 shows the age{earnings proles in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 for Norwegian males
aged 25{59. This gure conrms the picture from other developed countries: average
earnings rise rapidly at younger ages, peak when individuals are in their 40s, and then
decline slightly in the latest parts of the working life.4 The strong relationship between
age and earnings implies that earnings inequality in a given year may be present even
in an economy where everyone is completely equal in all respects other than age, simply
because individuals are at dierent stages in the life cycle. In 2000, for instance, the
average annual earnings of a 50-year-old were 40 percent higher than those of a 30-year-
old, but that does not necessarily imply that the average lifetime earnings of 50-year-olds
is any higher than the average lifetime earnings of 30-year-olds.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Panel B in Figure 1 graphs the size of individual cohorts of Norwegian males from
the total resident population aged 25{59 in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000. We immediately
3Paglin's age adjustment of the Gini coecient was subject to three rounds of comments and replies
in the American Economic Review (Paglin, 1977, 1979, 1989), has numerous citations, and continues to
be subject to controversy. For a review of the literature, see Alm as and Mogstad (2010).
4To make nominal gures comparable across dierent years, earnings throughout this paper are ad-
justed for wage growth. This is implemented by using the basic amount thresholds of the Norwegian
Social Insurance Scheme (used to dene labor market status, determining eligibility for unemployment
benets as well as disability and old-age pension). The basic amounts are adjusted for wage growth by
Parliament in the National budget each year. Specically, nominal income in year t, Yt, is adjusted such
that ~ Yt = YtG2006=Gt, where Gt is the basic amount threshold in year t and ~ Y is the adjusted income
measure.
3see the relatively small birth cohorts before and during World War II and the subsequent
boom in population growth. This demographic shift has manifested large changes in the
age composition of the labor force over the course of the previous decades. In particular,
the baby boomers have, since the 1970s, gradually entered the labor market, and as their
careers have matured, they have been making their way along the age{earnings prole. It
follows that inequality in annual earnings may change over time simply because of changes
in the age-structure, weighing dierent parts of the age{earnings prole dierently, even
as inequality in lifetime earnings could be unchanged.
Figure 2 illustrates the large amount of ballast that may be embedded in snapshots
of earnings inequality and its time trend as a result of the changing age structure. As a
benchmark, we compute the classical Gini-coecient (G) in annual earnings of Norwegian
males aged 25{59 during 1967{2000. Similar to the situation in most other developed
countries, inequality fell slightly during the 1970s before increasing during the 1980s and
into the early 1990s. However, after the peak in inequality in 1993, G declines somewhat.
The time trend in the classical Gini coecient is discussed in detail in Section 5.
Consider instead inequality in a hypothetical situation in which everyone in the econ-
omy is completely equal in all respects other than age: while earnings vary over the
life-cycle, every individual at a given age would have exactly the same earnings as others
at that age. To illustrate that there could be substantial earnings inequality at a given
point in time in this hypothetical situation, we compute the between-group Gini-coecient
(G b) for every year in the period 1967{2000. Specically, G b replaces the earnings of
each individual with his age-group mean, where each cohort is a separate age-group and
can therefore be viewed as a measure of inequality in the age{earnings proles. We nd
that a substantial fraction of overall inequality is attributable to inequality between age
groups. In 1993, for example, G b accounts for more than 20 percent of overall inequality
in G. This illustrates that the age{earnings relationship may make us confuse older with
richer, as G incorporates substantial cross-sectional inequality that might even out over
time.
[Figure 2 about here.]
To get a sense of how inequality in this hypothetical situation might have evolved over
time, Figure 2 also displays the time trend in G b. We can see that inequality between
age groups increased over the late 1980s and into the early 1990s, when it had almost
doubled since 1967. However, after the peak in inequality between age groups in 1993,
G b declines steadily, and in 2000 it reaches the levels observed in the early 1980s. Since
the early 1980s, the time pattern in G b mirrors the time trend in G. This suggests that
inequality between age groups may have been an important determinant of the observed
trend in earnings inequality. However, as will be apparent in Section 3, this exercise is
too stylized to draw inference about the age eect on earnings inequality and its trend.
4However, it serves as a motivation for taking a closer look at how much the changing age
structure matters for the trend in inequality. This is the focus of the rest of the paper.
3 Age adjustment of the Gini coecient
The empirical analyses of inequality in income or earnings distributions are conventionally
based on the Lorenz curve. To summarize the information content of the Lorenz curve
and to achieve rankings of intersecting Lorenz curves, the classical Gini coecient (G)
is often used. This measure is equal to twice the area between the Lorenz curve and
its equality reference. In a seminal paper, Paglin (1975) argues that G overspecies the
conditions of equality when applied to cross-sectional data: assuming for the moment no
economic growth, perfect equality requires not only equal lifetime earnings but also that
individuals of all ages have equal earnings in any given year, which can be realized only
if there is a at age{earnings prole.
However, a at age{earnings prole runs counter to consumption needs over the life-
cycle as well as productivity variation depending on human capital investment and ex-
perience. As illustrated above, the relationship between earnings and age can produce
inequality at a given point in time, even if everyone is completely equal in all respects
but age. Moreover, inequality in annual earnings may change over time simply because of
changes in the age-structure: a change in the age structure changes the weights we give to
the dierent parts of the age{earnings prole and may subsequently change the measured
inequality, even if inequality in lifetime earnings is unchanged. For this reason, it has long
been argued that age adjustments of cross-sectional measures of inequality are necessary
(see, e.g., Atkinson, 1971). Such an adjustment allows us to utilize the cross-sectional
data at our disposal while avoiding some of the pitfalls associated with its use.
In our empirical analysis, we use three dierent age-adjusted inequality measures.
They all have the same objective, namely to purge the classical Gini coecient applied
to cross-sectional data of its inter-age or life-cycle component: In particular, the implicit
assumption of a at age{earnings prole is relaxed. Below, we rst describe the new and
improved method for the age adjustment of inequality, proposed by Alm as and Mogstad
(2010). Next, we discuss its relationship with the classical Gini coecient as well as its
relationship with two previous age-adjusted inequality measures.
3.1 The setup
Consider a society consisting of n individuals, where every individual i is characterized
by the pair (yi;e yi), where yi denotes his actual earnings and e yi are the equalizing earnings
in a given year. If actual and equalizing earnings are the same for all individuals and
they live equally long, there is a perfect equality of lifetime earnings. Roughly speaking,
5the equalizing earnings are the same for all individuals belonging to the same age group
in this society; it is a function of individual i's age but not that of any other individual
characteristics. If no other earnings-generating factor is correlated with age, then the
equalizing earnings are simply the mean earnings of each age group. Furthermore, if
there are no age eects on earnings, the equalizing earnings will be equal to the mean
earnings in society as a whole.
The joint cross-sectional distribution Y of actual and equalizing earnings is given by
Y = [(y1;e y1);(y2;e y2);:::;(yn;e yn)].
Let  denote the set of all possible joint distributions of actual and equalizing earnings,
such that the sum of the actual earnings equals the sum of the equalizing earnings. Fol-
lowing Alm as and Mogstad (2010), suppose that the social planner imposes the following
modied versions of the standard conditions on an inequality partial ordering dened
on the alternatives in , where A  B represents that there is at least as much age-
adjusted inequality in B as in A.5 Let  denote the mean earnings of the population
as a whole, and i represent the dierence between individual i's actual earnings yi and
equalizing earnings e yi. Let the distributions of such dierences for the two distributions
(i(A) = yi(A)   e yi(A) and i(B) = yi(B)   e yi(B)) be sorted in ascending order.
Condition 1. Scale Invariance: For any a > 0 and A;B 2 , if A = aB, then A  B.
Condition 2. Anonymity: For any permutation function : n ! n and for A;B 2 ,
if (yi(A);e yi(A)) = (y(i)(B);e y(i)(B)) for all i 2 n then A  B.
Condition 3. Unequalism: For any A;B 2  such that (A) = (B), if i(A) =
i(B) for every i 2 n, then A  B.
Condition 4. Generalized Pigou{Dalton: For any A;B 2 , if there exist two
individuals s and k such that s(A) < s(B)  k(B) < k(A), i(A) = i(B) for all
i 6= s;k, and s(B)   s(A) = k(A)   k(B), then A  B.
Scale invariance states that, if all actual and equalizing earnings levels are rescaled by
the same factor, then the level of age-adjusted inequality remains the same. Anonymity
implies that the ranking of alternatives should be unaected by a permutation of the
identity of individuals. Unequalism entails that the social planner is only concerned with
how unequally each individual is treated, dened as the dierence between his actual and
equalizing earnings.6 Finally, the generalized version of the Pigou{Dalton criterion states
that any xed transfer of earnings from an individual i to an individual j, where i > j,
reduces age-adjusted inequality.
5See Alm as et al. (2007) for analogous conditions imposed to study the equality of opportunity.
6This condition may therefore be viewed as analogous to the Focus axiom in poverty analysis, stating
that a poverty index should focus entirely on the earnings of the poor (see, e.g., Foster and Shorrocks
(1991)).
63.2 A new age-adjusted Gini coecient
The method proposed by Alm as and Mogstad (2010) for the age adjustment of inequality
may be described as a three-step procedure. First, a new age-adjusted Gini coecient
(AG) is derived. Second, a multivariate regression model is employed, allowing us to
isolate the net age eects on earnings while holding other determinants of earnings con-
stant. Third, the earnings distribution that characterizes perfect equality in age-adjusted
earnings is determined.
Denition of inequality measure. AG is based on a comparison of the absolute values of






i j(yi   e yi)   (yj   e yj)j
2n2 : (1)
It is straightforward to see that AG satises Conditions 1{4. Note that these conditions
are similar to those underlying G in all respects but one: The equalizing earnings are
not given by the mean earnings in the society as a whole but depends on the age of the
individuals.
Because it is straightforward to construct age-adjusted Lorenz curves based on the
distribution of dierences between actual and equalizing earnings, it is by no means nec-
essary to focus on the Gini coecient: Other inequality indices that are based on the
Lorenz curve can also rely on this method for age adjustments.
Identifying the net age eects. Suppose that the earnings of individual i at a given point
in time depends on his age a and a vector of individual characteristics X, such that
yi = g(ai;Xi). The functional form of g depends on the underlying model of earnings.
Following standard practice in empirical economics,7 we assume that age and the individ-
ual characteristics are multiplicatively separable, yi = f(ai)h(Xi). However, we will allow
for a exible functional form of f and h, yielding the following log-earnings equation
lnyi = lnf(ai) + lnh(Xi) = i + X
0
iB; (2)
where i gives the percentage earnings dierence of being in the age group of individual i
relative to some reference age group, holding all other variables constant. Equation (2) is
estimated by OLS separately for each year. The key assumption underlying this estimation
is that there are no omitted factors correlated with age that determine individual earnings.
In this case, we obtain consistent estimates of the net age eects on earnings. It is
important to emphasize that the objective of the estimation of Equation (2) is not to
7See Heckman et al. (2008) for a discussion of functional form assumptions in earnings regressions.
7explain as much variation as possible in earnings but simply to get an empirically sound
estimate of the eects of age on earnings.
Dening equalizing earnings. Identifying the net age eect is only part of the job; it is also
necessary to nd a consistent way of adjusting for age eects when there are other earnings-
generating factors. There is a considerable literature concerned with the problem of how
to adjust for some, but not all, earnings-generating factors when the earnings function
is not additively separable (see, e.g., Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) and Kolm (1996)).
To eliminate earnings dierences attributable to age but preserve inequality arising from
all other factors, AG employs the so-called general proportionality principle proposed
by Bossert (1995) and Konow (1996), and further studied by Cappelen and Tungodden
(2007).8 Then, the absence of age-adjusted inequality requires that any two individuals
belonging to a given age group have the same earnings level. Moreover, in any situation
in which everyone has the same earnings generating factors except age, there should be
no lifetime earnings inequality.
Specically, the equalizing earnings level of individual i depends on his age as well














where ek gives the net age eect of belonging to the age group of individual k after
integrating out the eects of other earnings generating factors correlated with age. No
age-adjusted inequality corresponds to every individual i receiving e yi, which is the share
of total earnings equal to the proportion of earnings an individual from his age group
would earn if all earnings generating factors except age were the same for everyone in the
population. If age is uncorrelated with all other earnings-generating factors, then e yi is
equal to the mean earnings level in his age group, i. Also, if there is no age eect on
earnings, then e yi is equal to the mean earnings level in the society, .
3.3 Relationship to the classical Gini coecient
The classical Gini coecient can be expressed as
8The generalized proportionality principle is not compatible solely with a multiplicative earnings-
generating function. On the contrary, it is very general principle in the sense that it would accept
any earnings generating function. However, we would not need this principle if the earnings generating





i j(yi   )   (yj   )j
2n2 : (4)
By comparing this expression to Equation (1), we can see there is a very close link
between G and AG. Both measures are based on a comparison of the absolute values
of the dierences in actual and equalizing earnings between all pairs of individuals. The
distinguishing feature is in the denition of equalizing earnings. For G, the equalizing
earnings level is assumed to be : perfect equality requires not only equal lifetime earnings
but also that individuals of all ages have the same earnings in any given year, which can
be realized only if there is a at age{earnings prole.
However, a at age{earnings prole runs counter to both consumption needs over
the life cycle and productivity variation depending on human capital investment and
experience. Indeed, the relationship between earnings and age can produce earnings
inequality at a given point in time, even if everyone is completely equal in all respects but
age. As transitory earnings dierences even out over time, a snapshot of the inequality
produced by G runs the risk of producing a misleading picture of actual variation in
lifetime earnings. In comparison, AG abandons the assumption of a at age{earnings
prole and allows equalizing earnings to depend on the age of the individuals. In doing so,
AG purges the cross-sectional measure of inequality of its inter-age or life cycle component.
If e yi =  for all individuals in every age group, then the age{earnings prole is at and
AG coincides with G.
To gain further intuition on the similarities and dierences between G and AG, it is
helpful to see the correspondence between the standard representation of the Lorenz curve
and a Lorenz curve expressed in dierences between actual earnings and mean earnings
in the society as a whole. Figure 3 displays standard and dierence- based Lorenz curves
for the same earnings distribution. The area between the standard Lorenz curve and the
diagonal of the upper diagram (the line of equality) is identical to the area between the
dierence-based Lorenz curve and the horizontal axis (the line of equality) in the lower
diagram. In both cases, G is equal to twice the area A, between the Lorenz curve and the
line of equality.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Along the same line, we can draw the age-adjusted Lorenz curve underlying AG,
expressing the dierences between actual earnings and the equalizing earnings in the
population. Additionally, just as for G, AG is equal to twice the area between this
dierence-based Lorenz curve and the horizontal axis (line of equality). When drawing
age-adjusted Lorenz curves, however, individuals are ordered not by their earnings per se,
as in Figure 3, but according to the dierence between actual and equalizing earnings.
9Both G and AG reach their minimum value of 0 if everyone receives their equalizing
earnings. Moreover, both measures reach their maximum when the dierence between
actual and equalizing earnings is at its highest possible level. Specically, G reaches its
maximum value of 1 if one individual has all earnings in the society. In comparison, AG
reaches its maximum of 2 in the hypothetical situation, in which the equalizing earnings
of the individual who has all the earnings is zero and the equalizing earnings of one of the
individuals with zero earnings is equal to the aggregate earnings in the economy. The fact
that AG and G range over dierent intervals is therefore a direct result of their dierent
views of perfect equality: age-adjusted inequality is not only a result of dierences in
individuals' actual earnings but also a result of dierences in equalizing earnings between
individuals at dierent points in the life cycle.
By the same token, AG will be smaller (greater) than G whenever the dierences in
individuals' earnings because of age are positively (negatively) correlated with dierences
in individuals' earnings attributable to other earnings generating factors.9 For example, an
individual with zero earnings will contribute less to inequality in AG than in G whenever
his equalizing earnings level is lower than the mean earnings in the society.
3.4 Relationship to previous age-adjusted inequality measures
There are two distinguishing aspects of age-adjusted inequality measures. First, they dier
in the way that they aggregate up the dierences between actual and equalizing earnings.
Second, they hold dierent views on how equalizing earnings should be measured. In this
paper, we consider two alternative age-adjusted inequality measures: PG and the Wertz'
Gini (WG). They both have the same objective as AG, namely to purge G applied to
snapshots of earnings inequality of its inter-age or life cycle component. In particular, the
condition of a at age{earnings prole is relaxed. Below, we use Conditions 1{4 to assess
the properties of PG and WG and to characterize their relationship to AG.
Because of its close relationship to AG, it is convenient to rst consider WG, which was
proposed by Wertz (1979). He claims that PG fails to adjust properly for age eects, but
his comment has been largely ignored, perhaps because Wertz does not put up conditions





i j(yi   i)   (yj   j)j
2n2 ; (5)
where i and j denote the mean earnings of all individuals belonging to the age group of
individual i and j, respectively. Like AG, WG is based on a comparison of the absolute
9To see this, let i = yi e yi for any individual i, and note that AG and G have the same denominator.
While the numerator of AG aggregates ji jj over all pairs of individuals, the numerator of G aggregates
j(e yi + i)   (e yi + j)j of all pairs of individuals. Therefore, G > AG whenever cov(e y;) > 0.
10values of the dierences in actual and equalizing earnings levels between all pairs of
individuals and ranges over the interval [0;2]. It is also straightforward to see that it
satises Conditions 1{4.
The distinguishing feature between AG and WG is that the latter measure denes
the equalizing earnings of an individual i as the unconditional mean earnings in his age
group, i, whereas the former measure denes his equalizing earnings as the net age eect
of belonging to his age group after integrating out the eects of other earnings-generating
factors correlated with age, e yi. Any dierences between AG and WG is therefore a result
of omitted variables bias in using i to measure equalizing earnings. As is well known, the
omitted variables bias in i depends on the eects of the omitted variables on earnings
and the eects of the omitted variables on age. For example, education is correlated with
both age and earnings. When using WG to evaluate the inuence of age adjustment
on the time trend in inequality, we may therefore confuse the eects of changes in the
age structure with the impact of more people taking higher education than before. The
formula for omitted variables bias tells us that WG will be equal to AG whenever age is
uncorrelated with omitted earnings generating factors. Therefore, AG may be viewed as
a generalization of WG and is important in situations where omitted variables bias is a
major concern.





i(jyi   yjj   ji   jj)
2n2 : (6)
Applying the standard Gini decomposition, PG can be rewritten as
PG = G   G b =
X
i
iGi + R; (7)
where G b represents the Gini coecient that would be obtained if the earnings of each
individual in every age group were replaced by the relevant age group earnings i, Gi
represents the Gini coecient of earnings within the age group of individual i, i is the
weight given by the product of this group's earnings share
nii
n and population share
ni
n
(ni is the number of individuals in the age group of individual i), and R captures the
degree of overlap in the earnings distributions across age groups (see, e.g., Lambert and
Aronson, 1993).10
Both WG and PG dene the equalizing earnings of an individual as the mean earn-
ings of the age group he belongs to, ignoring that other earnings generating factors are
10Overlap implies that the earnings of the richest person in an age group with a relatively low mean
earnings level exceeds the earnings of the poorest person in an age group with a higher mean earnings,
that is, yi < yj and i > j for at least one pair of individuals i and j.
11correlated with age. Unlike AG, they may eliminate not only inequality due to age but
also inequality because of these other factors.
In addition, PG stands out in the way it aggregates up the dierences in actual
and equalizing earnings. Specically, PG is based on a comparison of dierences in the
absolute values of actual and equalizing earnings levels between all pairs of individuals,
j(yi   yj)j   j(i   j)j. This runs counter to the Unequalism condition, as j(yi   yj)j  
j(i   j)j = 0 does not necessarily imply that j(yi   i)   (yj   j)j = 0.
The following numerical example shows that PG violates the Unequalism condition.
Consider two distributions A and B with two age groups, each consisting of two
individuals. Suppose that A0s distribution of actual and equalizing earnings, (yi(A),
i(A)), is given by
A = [(20;60);(100;60);(60;80);(100;80)],
whereas B0s distribution of (yi(B);i(B)) is given by
B = [(0;40);(80;40);(80;100);(120;100)].
In both cases, the distribution of dierences between the actual and equalizing earnings,
yi   i, is given by [f 40;40g;f 20;20g]. According to the Unequalism condition, age-
adjusted inequality measures should be the same when the distributions of dierences
between actual and equalizing earnings are the same. Whereas WG satises this condition,
PG violates it.11
Arguably, the Unequalism condition is an intuitively appealing condition, as it ensures
that age-adjusted inequality measures follow G in measuring inequality according to the
dierences in actual and equalizing earnings, between all pairs of individuals, rather than
the aggregated dierences in actual earnings minus the aggregated dierences in equalizing
earnings.12
As j(yi yj) (i j)j provides an upper bound for j(yi yj)j j(i j)j, it follows
that WG  PG. This begets the question: under which conditions will WG be equal to
PG, and subsequently, can we be sure that the two measures produce the same inequality
ranking? As proved by Alm as and Mogstad (2010), PG will dier from WG if there is any
age eect on earnings, provided that there is some within-age-group earnings variation.
11Specically, WG(A) = WG(B) = 0:25, whereas PG(A) = 0:179 6= PG(B) = 0:107.
12Our numerical example illustrates the dierence. Consider distribution A and the contribution to
age-adjusted inequality from the comparison of the richest individuals in the two age groups, for which
(yi(A);i(A)) is given by (100;60) and (100;80). Paglin advocates that perfect equality corresponds to
everyone receiving the mean earnings of their age group. An earnings comparison of this pair of individuals
should thus contribute with 20 to age-adjusted inequality, which is captured by the numerator of WG.
In contrast, the numerator of PG records a  20 contribution to age-adjusted inequality, the rationale for
which is hard to grasp.
12In particular, the overlap in the earnings distributions across age groups, that is, R > 0,
is a sucient but not a necessary, condition for WG > PG. This implies that PG is
likely to yield a dierent ranking than WG in situations where earnings distributions
dier substantially in the degree of overlap.
This result relates to a major controversy surrounding PG, namely whether or not R
should be treated as an inter-age or a within age-groups component.13 Until recently, the
issue was unsettled simply because little was known about the overlap term; Shorrocks
and Wan (2005), for example, refer to R as a \poorly specied" element of the Gini
decomposition. However, Lambert and Decoster (2005) provide a novel characterization of
the properties of R, showing rst that R unambiguously falls as a result of a within-group
progressive transfer, and second that R increases when the earnings in the poorer group is
scaled up, and reaches a maximum when means coincide. This led Lambert and Decoster
(2005, p. 378) to conclude that \the overlap term in R is at once a between-groups and
a within-groups eect: it measures a between-groups phenomenon, overlapping, that is
generated by inequality within groups". Therefore, R = 0 is necessary (although not
sucient) for PG to net out the inter-age component, and nothing but the inter-age
component, from cross-sectional inequality measures.
4 Data
Our data are based on administrative registers from Statistics Norway covering the entire
resident population in Norway between 1967 and 2000. The unique individual identier
allows the merging of information about individual characteristics, like age and education,
with data on annual earnings taken from tax registers in each year. From the individual
identiers, we are also able to link individuals to their parents, allowing the inclusion of
controls for family background. In the analysis, we employ a measure of earnings including
all market income, from wages and self-employment. In each year from 1967{2000, we
include the entire population of males aged 25{59 who were alive and resident in that
year.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for selected years. We see that while real earnings
(reported in 2006-NOK) are increasing over the period, the relation between age and
earnings is present in all years. The demographic wave induced by the baby boomers was
presented in detail in Panel B of Figure 1. At the same time, there are several changes in
the labor force, both in individual characteristics and in family background. For instance,
the level of education increases over the whole period, especially during the 1970s and
the early 1980s. In addition, we can see that the immigrant share of the labor force more
13Nelson (1977) and others argue that R is part of inter-age inequality and should thus be netted
out when constructing age-adjusted inequality measures. Paglin (1977), however, maintains that R is
capturing within-group inequality and that PG is accurately dened.
13than doubles. Furthermore, family size and parental age decreased somewhat, particularly
between 1990 and 2000.
[Table 1 about here.]
To calculate AG, we rst estimate the net age eects running OLS on the regression
equivalent of Equation (2), controlling for education, birth order, family size and immi-
gration, as well as parental education and age at birth. To allow for non-linearities in the
covariates, we include six dummies for education groups, as well as four dummies each
for number of siblings and birth order. We then calculate equalizing earnings as e yi by
applying the transformation in Equation (3) and then estimate AG from Equation (1).
PG is estimated from Equation (6), whereas WG is estimated from Equation (5).
5 Empirical analysis
Main ndings. Figure 4 displays the evolution over time in age-adjusted and age-
unadjusted earnings inequality. The insights can be summarized by two conclusions.
First, between 1980 and 1993, when the baby boomers were approaching the peak of their
age{earnings prole, AG shows a more modest increase in inequality than G. This nding
suggests that the large increase in earnings inequality over this period was partly driven
by changes in the age structure. Second, the trends in age-adjusted inequality during
1967{1980 and 1993{2000 are quite sensitive to the method used. In the former period,
AG shows a more moderate decrease compared to G and PG. Additionally, in the latter
period, AG follows G in suggesting a decline in inequality, whereas PG indicates little
change in inequality.
In sum, our results conform well to Paglin's (1975) study of the eects of age-
adjustment on earnings inequality in the US during 1947{1972: they suggest that changes
in the age-structure have signicant impacts on the trend in earnings inequality. However,
Paglin's suggested age adjustment performs quite dierently than the adjustment imple-
mented by AG. This illustrates that properly accounting for changes in age composition
can be crucial for interpreting changes in the distribution of earnings.
Classical Gini coecient. Before turning to a more detailed investigation of the dierent
age-adjusted inequality measures, let us rst consider the time trend in G. The measured
trend in unadjusted inequality not only serves as a benchmark but also is important in
its own right, providing rst evidence on the time trend in earnings inequality of the
male labor force in Norway over the last few decades. We can see that G decreased
substantially between 1967 and 1980, dropping by about 10 percent. Earnings inequality
then rebounded between 1980 and 1993, surpassing previous highs already in the late
1980s before dropping again between 1993 and 2000. Overall, the period under study
14saw a slight rise in inequality, estimated at about 2.5 percent. The much studied rise
in inequality during the 1980s, is quite apparent, however, with an increase of about 25
percent from a bottom of 0.30 in 1980 to a peak of 0.38 in 1993.
[Figure 4 about here.]
It should be noted that the increase in inequality in the early 1990s was associated
with a tax reform, and that inequality would have likely increased more steadily in the
absence of this reform. In particular, the increased inequality can at least partly be
explained by the high earners' response to large reductions in marginal tax rates (see
Aarbu and Thoresen, 2000). However, the spike in inequality in 1993 is most likely a
result of changes in the income reporting behavior rather than a result of factual changes
in the distribution of income (see Fjrli and Aaberge, 2000).
The Paglin-Gini. Panel A of Figure 5 displays the dierence between PG and G during
1967{2000. We can see that the two measures of inequality diverge at an increasing rate
until 1993, after which the dierence declines. As shown in Equation (7), PG yields a
dierent time trend in inequality insofar as there is signicant time variation in between-
group inequality, G b. Because G b is a population share-weighted average of the dierent
age-group means, it increases with (i) the disparity in mean earnings across age groups
and with (ii) the number of people in the age groups with relatively low or relatively high
mean earnings levels.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Figures 6 and 7 look into the rst possible explanation for the dierence between G
and PG. The rst gure displays the age-group mean earnings (divided by the mean
earnings in the population as a whole) in dierent years, suggesting that the age{earnings
relationship is strongest in the early 1990s. In line with this result, the latter gure shows
that the coecient of variation in mean earnings across age groups is relatively large in
the late 1980s and in the early 1990s. These results suggest that increased disparity in
mean earnings may help explain why PG diers most from G during this period.
[Figure 6 about here.]
[Figure 7 about here.]
To shed light on the second possible explanation for the dierence between G and
PG, Figure 8 graphs the population share in dierent age groups when the age groups are
sorted by their rank in the earnings distribution. We see that more people belong to the
age-groups with relatively high and low mean earnings in the early 1990s than in the other
years. This illustrates that the change in G b over time is not only a result of changes in
the age{earnings prole but also driven by changes in the demographic composition.
15[Figure 8 about here.]
A new age-adjusted Gini coecient. As discussed above, the age-adjusted Gini coecient
proposed by Alm as and Mogstad (2010) addresses two common criticisms of PG: (i) the
way the dierences between actual and equalizing earnings is aggregated and (ii) how
equalizing earnings is measured. To examine the rst issue, we focus on the comparison
between PG and WG. The reason is that WG, on the one hand, aggregates the dierences
between actual and equalizing earnings in the same way as AG but on the other hand
conforms with PG in measuring equalizing earnings of an individual as the earnings of
the age group to which he belongs.
Panel A of Figure 5 displays the dierence between PG and WG during 1967{2000.
We can see that the time trend in WG diers substantially from that produced by AG,
especially during 1980{2000. As discussed in Section 3.2, WG will dier from PG if there
is any age eect on earnings, provided that there is some within-group earnings variation.
In particular, overlap in the earnings distributions across age groups is a sucient but
not necessary condition for WG to exceed AG. Figure 9 shows that the inequality due to
overlap in the earnings distribution makes up a large fraction of overall earnings inequality.
It is also clear that the overlap term increases from 1980 until the early 1990s, during
which the dierence between WG and PG also increases. This indicates that the changes
over time in the degree of overlap in the earnings distributions may help to explain the
dierences in the age-adjusted time trends in inequality according to WG and PG.
[Figure 9 about here.]
To examine the second issue, we turn our attention to the comparison between WG
and AG. From Panel B of Figure 5, we can see that the time trend produced by AG
is quite dierent from that of WG. This holds true for AG 0, in which case we have
only controlled for individual background characteristics, as well as for AG 1, where we
also control for family background characteristics. In particular, we can see that AG
suggests a smaller decline in inequality during 1967-1980 and a less pronounced increase
in inequality during the late 1980s and early 1990s. After the peak in earnings inequality
in 1993, AG suggests a stronger decline in inequality.
As discussed in Section 3, any dierence between WG and AG is due to omitted
variables bias in using i to measure equalizing earnings. In particular, the omitted
variables bias in i depends on the eects of the omitted variables on earnings and the
eects of the omitted variables on age. The relatively large dierences between WG and
AG 0 suggests that controlling for individual background characteristics is quite important
for the age adjustment of inequality, whereas the small dierence between AG 0 and AG 1
implies that the controls for family background characteristics matters little (conditional
on individual background characteristics). When regressing the individual background
16characteristics on earnings as well as on age, we nd that education stands out as a
key source of omitted variable bias in WG and its trend. First of all, education has a
strong positive correlation with both earnings and age, which helps to explain why AG
exceeds WG in a given year. In addition, when using WG to evaluate the inuence of
age adjustment on the time trend in inequality, we confuse the eects of changes in the
age structure with the impact of higher education among the new cohorts that entered
the workforce. This is mirrored in an increasing variation across age groups in years of
education over the 1970s and into the early 1980s. After peaking in 1983, this variation
decreased throughout the rest of the period, reecting that the older cohorts with low
education were retiring. As a consequence, the contribution from education to omitted
variables bias in WG is expected to increase until the early 1980s and then decrease, which
is consistent with Panel B of Figure 5. Along the same lines, other individual background
characteristics contribute to explaining the omitted variable bias in WG and its trend,
such as immigrant status and family size.
Additively decomposable inequality measures. Finally, we follow Mookherjee and Shorrocks
(1982) in using members of the family of generalized entropy inequality measures to com-
pute age-adjusted and unadjusted trends in earnings inequality. In the spirit of Paglin,
they make age adjustment by subtracting between-group inequality from overall inequal-










i ;  > 0; (8)
where E denotes the entropy measure of overall inequality, E
b is the entropy index that
would be obtained if the earnings of each individual in every subgroup were replaced by
the relevant age group's means i, Ei represents the entropy index within the age group
of individual i, and i denotes the associated weight, which is a function of this group's
relative mean earnings
i
 and population share
ni
n . The  parameter reects the sensitivity
to changes in dierent parts of the distribution, with  = 0 giving the most weight to the
lower tail. Following common practice in empirical analysis using the entropy measures,
we compute PE for  equal to zero, one, and two.
Figure 10 displays the trends in overall inequality and within-group inequality accord-
ing to the entropy measures. We can see that the entropy measures produce very similar
trends in overall inequality compared to the classical Gini coecient. However, more im-
portantly, it is evident that between-group inequality makes up little of overall inequality.
Therefore, PE suggests that age adjustment is of minor importance. However, we need
to be cautious in drawing this conclusion. While it is often argued that the absence of
an overlap term makes the entropy measures more suitable for decomposition analysis,
17the overlap term does have value from another perspective in providing useful informa-
tion that additively decomposable indices must, by denition, ignore.14 In addition, PE
suers from the problem of omitted variables bias in the denition of equalizing earnings,
just as PG and WG.
[Figure 10 about here.]
6 Concluding remarks
This paper demonstrates how age-adjusted inequality measures can be used to evaluate
whether changes in inequality over time are due to changes in the age structure. In par-
ticular, we have investigated to what extent age adjustments aect the trend in earnings
inequality in Norway between 1967 and 2000. We nd that it does and, further, that the
impact of the adjustment depends crucially on the method applied.
Before adjusting for age, the classical Gini shows a substantial decrease in inequality
between 1967 and 1980, a sharp increase between 1980 and 1993, and then a drop from
1993 to 2000. Overall, our estimates reveal a slight increase in inequality from 1967 to
2000. Our preferred measure of age-adjusted inequality reveals, however, a more modest
decline of inequality in the rst period, a smaller increase in the intermediate period, and
a steeper decrease in inequality in the latest period. These ndings stand in contrast
to the results from the much-used approach proposed by Paglin (1975), which has been
questioned from a number of perspectives.
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(a) Panel A: Earnings prole in 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000.
(b) Panel B: Age composition in 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000.
Figure 1: Earnings prole (panel A) and the changing age composition of the labor force
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Figure 2: Trends in overall and between-group earnings inequality among males aged
25{59 during 1967{2000
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Figure 4: Trends in age-adjusted and unadjusted earnings inequality among males aged
25{59 during 1967{2000.
Notes: G = Classical Gini coecient, AG = Age-adjusted Gini controlling for individual background
characteristics (education, immigration status, number of siblings, birth order, and number of children),
AG0 = Age-adjusted Gini controlling for individual and family background characteristics (mother's
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Figure 5: Dierences between inequality measures.
Notes: This gure is based on Figure 4. Panel A displays the dierence between G and PG, and the










































Figure 6: Relative age-group mean earnings for dierent years.
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Figure 8: Population share in age groups sorted by their rank in the earnings distribution.
Notes: This gure displays the population share of the age groups when the age-groups are sorted in
an ascending order by their rank in the earnings distribution. The lines have been smoothed using a
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Figure 9: Degree of overlap in the earnings distribution across age-groups for dierent
years.
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Panel B
Figure 10: Trend in overall inequality and within-group inequality according to the en-
tropy measures.
Notes: This gure displays overall inequality and within-group inequality according to the entropy mea-
sures, with  equal to zero, one, and two. When  is equal to zero or one, we have to exclude the
observations with zero earnings, as these entropy measures are not dened for zero earnings.
29Table 1: Descriptive statistics
1970 1980 1990 2000
Earnings, 2006-NOK
Mean 289,707 325,998 342,462 373,084
Age 26{29 248,581 266,849 263,080 289,886
Age 30{39 302,713 336,944 342,187 367,602
Age 40{49 311,392 355,340 386,041 409,659
Age 50{59 275,295 319,540 335,314 380,551
Individual characteristics
Age 42.34 40.73 40.30 41.46
Education (years) 9.79 10.67 11.35 11.88
Immigrant 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.14
No. of children 2.53 2.55 2.47 2.31
Family characteristics
Mother's education 7.82 8.18 8.59 9.19
Father's education 8.42 8.96 9.41 9.96
Mother's age at birth 29.34 29.55 29.04 28.12
Father's age at birth 32.67 33.02 32.60 31.53
Observations 810,643 892,038 989,901 1,118,735
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